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ICT and Elections in Nigeria: 
Rural Dynamics of Biometric Voting
Technology Adoption
Victor Chidubem Iwuoha 
Abstract: Applications of Information and Communications Technology 
(ICT)-driven innovations are profound in the electoral cycle. Among 
them, biometric technology is currently sweeping across developing coun-
tries. It is, however, only poorly adopted among rural voters. Does the 
use of biometric technology in the conduct of elections reconstruct rural 
voters’ behaviour, amid prevailing social challenges? The links between 
these realities and their consequences are currently less understood, and 
lacking in supporting literature. I argue that the public perception of bio-
metric technology, the availability of proper infrastructure, and the dis-
tance between polling stations and the dwellings of rural voters all affect 
the latter’s level of adoption of biometric technology. These interactions 
combine to produce specific modalities that shape voting behaviour and 
general political culture. I elicit primary data from voters in Nigeria’s 
remote villages, so as to predict the implications and consequences of 
glossing over the dimensions and magnitude of the biometric technology 
adaptation challenge by policymakers. I conclude by reflecting on how 
these interplays and interactions create “spatial differentials” in electoral 
outcomes/credibility, and proffer possible strategies for institutional 
intervention. 
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Introduction
African fledgling democracies have had persistent difficulties in conduct-
ing free, fair, credible, and transparent elections. Most are marred by 
gross irregularities, electoral fraud, violence, and inconclusive ballots 
(Ayoade 1998). This is why most African states fervently desire to key 
into modern technological systems in the conduct of elections, namely to 
strengthen the quality of the electoral process (Diamond 2008). Bio-
metric identification systems are currently already in widespread use for 
voter registration in over 34 of the world’s low- and middle-income 
countries. African states such as Ghana, Mali, Kenya, Cameroon, Sierra 
Leone, Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal, and Mauritania 
have all enrolled – with varying degrees of success (Gelb and Clark 
2013). Golden, Kramon, and Ofosu offer insights to show that  
these technological solutions, such as electronic voting machines, 
polling station webcams, and biometric identification equipment 
offer the promise of rapid, accurate, and ostensibly tamper-proof 
innovations that are expected to reduce fraud in the processes of 
registration, voting, or vote count aggregation. (Golden, Kramon, 
and Ofosu 2014: 1) 
On the same footing, Professor Attahiru Jega, former chairman of the 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), who oversaw the 
introduction of biometric voting technology in Nigeria, affirms:  
We have made rigging impossible for them (electoral fraudsters) 
as there is no way the total number of votes cast at the polling unit 
could exceed the number of accredited persons. Such discrepancy 
in figures will be immediately spotted. This technology made it 
impossible for any corrupt electoral officer to connive with any 
politician to pad-up results. The card reader machines will help us 
to address all those irregularities, starting from the accreditation of 
voters at all the polling units. The information stored in both the 
card readers and the result sheets taken to the ward levels would 
be retrieved once there is evidence of tampering [...]. We believe 
that this is an added value to our process, it is something that we 
have not been able to do in the past. (Jega, cited in Nnochiri 2015) 
This sheer confidence appears robust and seemingly genuine. Nonethe-
less, certain fundamental concerns persist and remain challenges. For 
instance, no attention is drawn to understanding the level of spatial dif-
ferentiations in rural voters’ behaviour in specific localities during the 
conducting of elections. This makes it extremely difficult – almost im-
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possible in fact – to feed policymakers with vital judgements concerning 
the specific localities where voters easily cope with the biometric voting 
systems and those where they do not. The central questions, then, that 
underpin and animate this study are: What are the social factors that 
impinge on the voting behaviour of dwellers in rural communities? How 
does the use of biometric technology interface with and resolve the 
adoption challenges of rural voters during the electoral process? 
It is important to establish the extent to which such factors com-
bine to redefine or reconstruct rural voters’ encounters with Information 
and Communications Technology (ICT)-driven biometrics, and conse-
quently determine electoral outcomes. Whereas rural voters originally 
tend to exhibit a less instinctive drive for electoral participation, their 
apolitical dispositions are particularly informed by certain fundamental 
social realities – including negative perceptions and/or increasing appre-
hension about biometric technology systems, the non-availability of 
proper infrastructure, and the significant distance between polling sta-
tions and their dwellings. These circumstances shed some small light on 
rural voters’ electoral assertiveness, and their general behaviour during 
election time. 
Most analysts associate the observed malfunctioning of voting 
smart card readers (SCRs) with technical and manufacturing faults (Elec-
tion Monitor 2015), while others maintain that such an eventuality is a 
result of a combination of factors – such as the inability of some voters 
to read and write (Fujiwara 2015), the unpreparedness of the INEC and 
its ad hoc staff (National Democratic Institute 2015), and a generally low 
level of awareness (Dahiru, Abdulkadir, and Baba 2017). There is little 
agreement, then, among scholars on the causes of rural voters’ behaviour 
on election day. I add a third perspective here: negative perceptions and 
divergence in the symbolic attachments to white man-inspired biometric 
technology. In combination with debilitating social conditions, these 
together underpin and reinforce political apathy, low and half-hearted 
electoral participation, voter restraint, self-withdrawal, feelings of unwill-
ingness, a sense of fear, and atypical threat notions among rural voters.  
Mutual suspicion and fear, contextual discrimination, and feelings of 
political intrusion and endangerment over ethnic heritage affect the per-
ception of rural voters when it comes to biometric technology. This is 
what largely constitutes the poor adaption of rural voters to biometric 
systems. Since local dwellers are characteristically bonded by strong  
socio-economic, cultural, and historical facts or myths (Onyima and 
Iwuoha 2015), for instance, these beliefs tends to define or recreate their 
specific and peculiar voting behaviours. The electoral views of rural 
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voters are predominantly constructed along negative lines of thinking, 
and this leads to low voter turnout generally.  
While policymakers and public analysts are yet trapped in the ful-
crum of policy goals, such as expanding the benefits and reliability of 
biometric technology and ICT infrastructure generally, specific social 
dynamics – ones that have been less rigorously identified – continue to 
interact negatively with the purposes and goals of biometric technology 
and of other ICT systems drafted in for the better conducting of elec-
tions. This study will attempt to predict the implications and conse-
quences of merely glossing over the dimensions and magnitude of these 
impending challenges. The findings chart a new frontier in knowledge 
production by defining the dynamics and specificities of these social 
complexities, and their potency to reshape and recast the nature of rural 
voters’ encounters with biometric technology. What is implicated in this 
reality check is a clear picture of the impact of these complex and chang-
ing interactions on electoral outcomes in general. 
How Voters Perceive the Functionality of
Biometric Voting Technology
There has been a remarkable increase in the deployment of ICTs in elec-
tions over the last two decades – a trend that is most clearly visible in 
Africa and Asia. ICTs in the form of digital technologies deployed by 
electoral commissions include those associated with electronic voter 
registration, voter verification, and results transmission (Cheeseman, 
Lynch, and Willis 2018). Technology can reinforce voters’ trust in the 
electoral process, with perceived reductions in electoral fraud (Gelb and 
Diofasi 2016). Following Ghana’s 2012 voter-registration process, over 
three-quarters of registered Ghanaians agreed that doing it biometrically 
represented an improvement over the old system; some 87 per cent 
believed it to be a useful tool for promoting credible and peaceful elec-
tions (Piccolino 2015; Gelb and Diofasi 2016). 
The Nigerian experience specifically remains one of daunting chal-
lenges, even some years after the introduction of biometric technology to 
the conducting of elections. McGrath and Maiye (2010a) assert that, 
despite a number of interventions promoting the innovation, these ef-
forts have failed to institutionalise the electronic voter registration (EVR) 
system, which was poorly perceived after the elections amid reports of 
high levels of electoral malpractice. The 2015 elections in Nigeria, for 
instance, showed how voting technology failure occurred in the middle 
of an election, making it impossible for SCRs to consistently identify 
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voters’ fingerprints. It was a terrible experience in the interior localities 
where voters have the lowest propensity for biometric technology adop-
tion, and this prompted manual accreditation – and consequently over-
voting. 
Harold (1967) focuses on the impact of the cognitive and psychologi-
cal dispositions of voters in making their choices. The argument is that 
voters’ electoral conduct is predominantly driven by their specific percep-
tions of or rigid attributions to voting systems and facilities. Harold’s study 
provides only a vague understanding of whether perceptions of bio-
metric technology engender voter apathy among rural voters. Many in 
the most remote areas have less confidence in themselves, and thus can 
not summon the courage to subject themselves to the process of voter-
verification systems. 
In Nigeria, for instance, voter turnout declined to merely 47 per 
cent in the 2015 general elections, when biometric technology was first 
introduced. This turnout is significantly less than that of preceding elec-
tions in the country. Registered voter turnout on aggregate since 1999 
elections has been at an average of 55.13 per cent. The specific level of 
voter turnout in Nigerian general elections since the end of the last cen-
tury is as follows: 1999 (52 per cent), 2003 (69 per cent), 2007 and 2011 
(54 per cent). 
Gelb and Diofasi (2016) posit that the track record of technological 
solutions is ultimately only mixed. Failures can be technological (inability 
to read fingerprints) or due to poor implementation and logistics (kits 
distributed without power or with no time for their charging). They may 
be unintended, or alternatively result from deliberate actions. It is also 
possible that biometric technology can perpetuate an atmosphere of 
suspicion and mistrust, by circumventing the human processes that have 
to work – and have to be seen to work. This is because the core compo-
nents of the election are placed in a “black box” that voters cannot ob-
serve or evaluate objectively for fairness themselves (Evrensel 2010). 
Therefore, without an understanding of how the technology works, there 
is little or no basis for either increased trust among political parties or for 
greater legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate. There is no guarantee, 
then, that the use of technology will result in cleaner, less contested, and 
more democratic elections (Gelb and Diofasi 2016). 
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Social Factors Relevant in Elections Conducted
with Biometric Voting Technology
The study of Evrensel (2010) represents a signpost for other relevant 
works echoing the issues weaved around the organisational and logistical 
challenges that the new biometric technology can generate. Evrensel 
contends that the use of high-level technology in voter-registration pro-
cesses has raised the issue of moving fragile electronic equipment across 
treacherous terrain, sometimes resulting in the corruption or even com-
plete loss of the very information that is being sought after. More prob-
lematic besides is that these days, especially in Nigeria, it has become 
difficult to register voters close to their homes. This is mainly because of 
the limited number of voters that biometric SCRs are programmed to 
accept in a given polling station. Many voters are therefore registered 
very far away from their place of residence, and this creates confusion 
among them when it comes to locating their proper polling station on 
election day. 
Effah and Debrah (2018) focus on the importance of social factors 
for the success and effectiveness of biometric technology, explaining 
how and why Ghana’s first attempts at using it for voter identification 
and verification in its 2012 general elections failed. The authors reveal 
that the effectiveness of biometric technology regarding the provision of 
reliable identification does not depend solely on its technical qualities, 
but also on real-time connectivity between registration centres and an 
electronic national register. Inadequate training of electoral officials on 
how to operate the machines and a lack of guidance on how to handle 
situations when breakdowns occur were also implicated as factors that 
contributed to the failure of the elections in Ghana in their findings. 
In a related study, McGrath and Maiye (2010b) draw on Sen’s 
(1999) capability approach (CA) to examine the social arrangements for 
registration and voting in Nigerian elections, and their influence on citi-
zens’ freedom to participate in the valued activity of electing their lead-
ers. They assessed citizens to benefit from the process in a way that 
expanded their freedom to choose, but found also that the arrangements 
made by INEC to enable registration and voting in elections did not 
ultimately reflect the actual desires or interests of the people themselves. 
Nigerian citizens do not currently possess the required freedom to exer-
cise their agency in this manner. In other words citizens lacked a number 
of the basic socio-economic capabilities enabling freedom of political 
expression, with consequences for the sustainability of the EVR initia-
tive. 
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Much of the research on developing countries therefore highlights a 
link between ICTs and development, studied from varying standpoints 
about the nature of this connection and also the ways in which desired 
benefits may be achieved (McGrath and Maiye 2010a). Similarly Cheese-
man, Lynch, and Willis (2018) concur on the consolidating benefits of 
digital technology and its implications for African elections. They main-
tain that the use of biometric technology in elections enhances the poll-
ing environment, and makes the electoral commission more robust and 
efficient. This is achieved by generating greater clarity and transparency 
regarding election outcomes. However, the authors remain silent on the 
specific implications of biometric technology within rural environments. 
Whether the use of biometric technology in the conducting of elections 
in such geographical areas has enhanced electoral outcomes – especially 
by increasing voter participation – has therefore remained less under-
stood. This links to Joel Barkan’s (2013) argument that new technology 
in Africa often fails because insufficient attention is paid during the pro-
cess of rolling it out to the broader management structures that it needs 
to even function. 
Golden, Kramon, and Ofosu (2014) also conducted a study in 
Ghana during the 2012 national elections, when biometric identification 
machines were introduced into every polling station in the country as a 
way to reduce the very high levels of electoral fraud known in particular 
to affect voter registration. The authors randomly selected a large sample 
of electoral constituencies and polling stations in four of the ten Ghana-
ian regions, between them home to half of the country’s population, and 
studied whether the presence of election observers systematically reduces 
machine malfunction. The main findings included a non-random pattern 
in machine breakdowns: they were much more likely to malfunction in 
electorally competitive areas and in polling stations without an election 
observer present. Two types of election fraud – overvoting and ballot 
stuffing – were identified and furthermore found to more commonly 
occur in polling stations affected by the breakdown of the biometric 
identification machines, especially when an election observer was not 
present. This means that individuals interfered with the operation of 
biometric identification machines, and also took advantage of machine 
breakdowns to commit electoral fraud. 
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Methodology
This study is based on research data collected during post-election, six-
month-long field trips and subsequent return visits to rural communities 
spread across three of Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones – namely, South 
East (SE), South South (SS), and North Central (NC) – between July 
2015 and October 2017. The localities and federal states of the commu-
nities engaged in the study are as follows: Zaki-Biam, in Benue; Afikpo, 
in Ebonyi; and Ogwashi-Ukwu, in Delta. The population size of these 
towns, from largest to smallest, is as follows: Afikpo: 71,866; Ogwashi-
Ukwu: 26,137; Zaki-Biam: 10,470 (World Population Review 2018).  
Afikpo is a hilly area that sits at the southern part of Ebonyi State 
along with neighbouring towns such as Akpha, Unwana, Edda, and 
Amasiri. It is a transitional area between open grassland and tropical 
forest. Agriculture is the mainstay of the Afikpo economy, engaging over 
75 per cent of locals – though some able-bodied youths in the communi-
ty have taken to fishing and hunting instead. Afikpo has less than 18 per 
cent of learned graduates from Nigerian universities (mostly civil ser-
vants), who combine their jobs with farming activities – and 10 per cent 
of whom are trained artisans, shop owners, and cyclists/bike riders. The 
community market day takes place once every eight days, where farm 
produce like fresh fish, okra, groundnuts, pepper, and potatoes are sold. 
With many indigenes engaging in the farming profession, the people of 
Afikpo are known to contribute significantly to the production of rice 
and millet across the whole Igboland and Nigeria in general. 
Ogwashi-Ukwu is located west of the state capital, Asaba, and is 
within the Aniocha Local Government Area (LGA). Ogwashi-Ukwu is 
predominantly an Igbo society, one that is rich in natural resources of 
different kinds. Generally, even though a sizeable number of people in 
Ogwashi-Ukwu are located in agricultural production and the farming 
business, the community maintains diverse sectors within their agrarian 
economy – ranging from agricultural extraction to call centres, vigilante 
groups, schoolteachers, trained artisans, commercial taxi drivers, cyclists/ 
bike riders, and retail businesses. 
Zaki-Biam is a small town located in the Sankera axis of Benue 
State. The town offers a distinct scenic view of the landscapes dotted 
with thatched roof mud huts and spectacular tribal culture. The vegeta-
tion of the town is characterised by forests, which yield trees for timber 
and provide a suitable habitat for rare animal types and species. The 
indigenes of Zaki-Biam are predominantly farmers, while a lesser num-
ber of people engage in fishing and hunting instead. Zaki-Biam has a 
very small percentage of learned graduates and trained artisans, teachers, 
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shop owners, cyclists/bike riders, and the like. The people are heavily 
involved in the production of yam. This makes Zaki-Biam West Africa’s 
largest yam market, and the single-biggest Nigerian market open only to 
buyers and sellers of yam. The town is said to make an average yearly 
sale of 1.5 million tubers. 
I employed a purposive sampling technique to ensure that the states 
and communities selected are not the most rich and well-educated ones 
in Nigeria especially. This is to ensure a fair and true view of the analysis, 
which is focused on less privileged local communities. The research 
methods used to gather data were qualitative ones, and based on in-
depth formal and semiformal interviews with eligible voters in rural 
communities. Focus-group discussion was also among the systematic 
qualitative techniques employed. The qualitative descriptive method of 
analysis was adopted, so as to make thick descriptions of all observed 
phenomenon. Three key informant interviews involving elders and 
community leaders (two males and a female) were conducted across the 
three selected local communities (i.e. one informant for each communi-
ty). Meanwhile 42 in-depth interviews (i.e. 14 persons for each communi-
ty) were conducted across the three communities, involving 18 males and 
24 females respectively. The researcher’s choice of in-depth interviews 
was possible only among those eligible voters not occupying elective or 
appointive positions, so that they could freely divulge relevant infor-
mation. Women have received adequate coverage in the study. The 
adoption of the interview method was particularly necessitated by the 
individuals concerned being less educated, and thus barely able to inter-
pret questionnaires effectively. 
Respondents were randomly selected and intersubjectively inter-
viewed. In-depth interviews consisted of open-ended questions. Inter-
viewees worked in diverse sectors within their agrarian economy, ranging 
from agricultural extraction to call centres, vigilante groups, schoolteach-
ers, trained artisans, commercial taxi drivers, cyclists/bike riders, and 
retail businesses. The interviewees mostly belonged to the uneducated 
and semi-educated middle class, with only shallow knowledge about the 
government and its activities. Key informant interviews involved mainly 
people considered to be knowledgeable or aware of happenings (18 years 
old and over) within the community, and who understand how its affairs 
are managed – such as community heads/leaders among others. 
In addition to the recorded interviews, informal conversations and 
discussions took place throughout the fieldwork with a diverse group of 
informants; this fundamentally enlightened and influenced the research. 
This article is, therefore, an account of the perspectives and political 
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behaviours or reactions of local community voters who encountered 
biometric technology during Nigerian elections. This is complemented 
with the researcher’s own observations and analytic perspectives on the 
political dimension, and on the interplay of the social factors that shape 
the political attitudes of these rural voters’ towards biometric technology. 
Therefore the study explores the patterns of voting responses in local 
communities after the introduction of biometric technology, and what 
impact it had on electoral credibility and general outcomes.  
I lived with the communities and immersed myself in their daily ac-
tivities for some weeks within the period of study, which endured be-
yond the elections. At the end of the fieldwork, I maintained contact 
with the key informants through phone calls. I adhered to basic human-
research ethics, such as seeking informed consent through written and 
oral channels and ensuring the maintenance of anonymity.  
Preparing the Biometric Technology for Election
Day
Biometric technology came with a number of related reforms in Nigeria. 
This was managed by the leadership of the INEC, led by Professor At-
tairu Jega. The reforms include: biometric voter registration, the intro-
duction of the Advanced Fingerprints Identification System, the custom-
isation of sensitive electoral materials such as ballot papers and result 
sheets, the colour coding of the ballot papers so as to render them use-
less in other constituencies if pilfered or snatched away, the issuance of 
chip-embedded and machine-readable Permanent Voter Cards (PVCs), 
as well as the rolling out of the earlier mentioned SCRs. The introduction 
of these devices was necessitated by the fact that reliable voter registra-
tion and identification mechanisms are among the preconditions for free, 
fair, and credible elections. Biometric machines authenticate the identity 
of voters using markers, such as fingerprints, that are almost impossible 
to counterfeit. The technologies are particularly useful in settings where 
governments have not previously established reliable or completely pa-
per-based identification systems for their populations (Gelb and Decker 
2012).  
The use of SCR machines, being the pivot of the biometric voting 
system, functioned as an anti-rigging technological device for the authen-
tication of voter’s cards in the 2015 Nigeria general elections (Beetseh 
and Akpoo 2015). The card reader uses a highly secure and cryptograph-
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ic technology that is commonly found in devices that need to perform 
secure transactions, such as pay terminals (Feng, Ng, and Schwiderski-
Grosche 2006). It has ultra-low power consumption, with a single core 
frequency of 1.2 GHz and an Android 4.2.2 operating system (INEC 
2015a). 
Moreover the INEC produced PVCs for the 68,833,476 persons 
enrolled in the biometric Register of Voters ahead of the 28 March and 
11 April 2015 general elections. The PVC replaced the Temporary Voter 
Card (TVC) issued during the 2011 voter-registration process. These 
cards have many components and specialised features (e.g. base sub-
strate, security printing, personalisation, lamination, and chip embed-
ding), and are designed with an average life span of 10 years. The PVC 
has an embedded chip that contains the biometrics of a legitimate holder 
(including their fingerprints and facial image). On election day, it would 
be swiped with a SCR at the polling unit to ensure the authentication and 
verification of the voter before he/she is allowed to participate. The 
PVC has security features that are not readily susceptible to counterfeit-
ing (INEC 2015a). The SCR keeps a tally of all cards read, comprising 
the details of all voters verified as well as those not – and transmits the 
collected information to a central INEC server via a GSM data service 
(The Guardian 2015; The Will 2015). 
Importantly, the production and distribution of PVCs remained a 
concern of voters, politicians, and political parties from across the politi-
cal spectrum in Nigeria alike (Dung 2015). Detailed descriptions of the 
awarded contracts for the voting technology in Nigeria is contained in 
Table 1. 
Table 1. Award of Contract for the Supply of Software Development and 
Support for PVC Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Readers
Company Name Lot 
Quoted 
Unit 
Price 
(NGN) 
Quantity 
Total 
Amount 
(NGN) 
Messrs Iris Smart Technolo-
gies Ltd 7 27,500.00 17,500 481,250,000 
Messrs Charms Plc 8 24,921.60 17,500 436,128,000 
Messrs Millennium Integrated 
Ltd 9 27,250.00 17,500 476,875,000 
Messrs ACT Technologies Ltd 10 27,500.00 17,500 481,250,000 
Total   70,000 1,875,503,000 
Source: Federal Executive Council Nigeria 2013. 
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The chairman of the INEC, Professor Attahiru Jega, confirmed that the 
card reader units have been broadly subjected to quality assurance, integ-
rity, and functionality testing, both locally and in Texas, United States, 
laboratories by the RFID Research Centre too. They were found to be of 
the highest quality grade and extremely reliable in terms of ease of use, 
battery life, and speed of processing (Jega 2015: 2). 
The INEC thus had confidence in the card readers, and so procured 
152,000 of them along with adequate overstock too – meaning an addi-
tional 26,000 units as spares as well as 35,000 surplus batteries. All of 
these together translated to one spare battery for every five polling units 
and one spare card reader for every seven. This was a reasonable backup 
plan. INEC staff were also trained and retrained (INEC 2015d). On 
Saturday 7 March 2015, the INEC conducted a test-run/public demon-
stration to ascertain the reliability of the SCRs in 225 out of the total 
120,000 polling units and in 358 out of the 155,000 voting centres across 
12 Registration Areas (RAs) (i.e. wards) in 12 states of the Federation 
(i.e. two states for each geopolitical zone). Affected RAs are situated in 
the following LGAs: Port Harcourt City (Rivers), Abakaliki (Ebonyi), 
Ado Ekiti (Ekiti), Gassol (Taraba), Kumbotso (Kano), Bunza (Kebbi), 
Kokona (Nasarawa), Shiroro (Niger), Ikeja (Lagos), Aguata (Anambra), 
Oshimili South (Delta), and Jama’are (Bauchi) (INEC 2015b).  
Overall only 59 per cent of voters who turned out for the test-run 
of the SCRs (i.e. the public demonstration) had their fingerprints suc-
cessfully authenticated. This meant a failure rate of 41 per cent (Idowu, 
cited in INEC 2015b). The Commission, in agreement with registered 
political parties, therefore provided that where the biometric authentica-
tion of a legitimate holder of a genuine PVC became a challenge then the 
person could be authenticated manually. Along with this, the completion 
of an Incident Form also took place – both steps to still allow the person 
to vote (INEC 2015b). This simply means resorting to manual accredita-
tion and voting, which grossly violated the INEC’s “Approved Guide-
lines and Regulations for the Conduct of 2015 General Elections.” Rele-
vant sections of the INEC’s “Accreditation And Voting Procedure” that 
were violated include the following ones: 
Accreditation: 
8(a) There shall be separate periods for accreditation and voting. 
8(b) The accreditation process shall comprise of verification of 
voters using the Card Reader; Checking of the Register of Voters; 
and inking of the cuticle of the specified finger. (INEC 2015c) 
 ICT and Elections in Nigeria 101 
The guidelines did not make any such provisions in any event for manual 
accreditation and voting, but the Commission nevertheless went ahead 
and reverted to processing voters by hand in such cases – thus under-
mining the essence of biometric technology’s introduction and use in the 
first place.  
Rural Voters and Elections: Perceptions, Social
Issues, and the Adaptability Challenge
Perceptions of Biometric Technology among Rural
Voters
Specific dimensions of rural voters’ perceptions of biometric technology 
would limit their adaptability to and general acceptance of it. Key in-
formants as well other rural voters from the three local communities 
investigated laid bare their views during informal interactions occurring 
in the course of the study. They provided vivid accounts of their roles 
and levels of political participation in the 2015 general elections in Nige-
ria, wherein biometric technology was used for voter identification and 
verification.  
A general dimension to the perceptions of the majority of the re-
spondents (85 per cent) during their encounter with biometric technolo-
gy was that of a feeling that there was a state conspiracy going on, one in 
which the power elites had adopted coercive and devious means to rig 
elections for their own selfish interests.1 The rural voters shared a com-
mon historical apprehension of political gladiators being out to achieve 
inflated demographic statistics under the pretext of holding an election. 
This aligns with Kaufman’s (2006) symbolic-analytical model, which 
stresses that the critical causes of ethnic grievances are group myths and 
fears of collective extinction. These hostile superstitions produce emo-
tion-laden symbols that affect the ability of rural dwellers to adapt to or 
accept new technology. Biometric technology was therefore seen by 
these locals2 as part of a secret plot to manipulate and truncate their 
population numbers to their disfavour, in the same way that political 
cabals had manipulated census figures in Nigeria ever since 1963. These 
1 Personal interviews as well as accounts of group discussions that I had with 
respondents across Afikpo, Ogwashi-Ukwu, and Zaki-Biam on 22 April 2015. 
2 Personal interview with a group of 11 rural voters in Afikpo community on 25 
October 2015. 
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voters preferred a head count, something that they are traditionally ac-
customed to, in place of such tiny “magic” (voting) machines.3 One 
middle-aged man presented this account: 
They [the government] simply don’t want us to participate fully in 
the voting. That is why they brought those machines [SCRs] to 
deceive everybody. Do you know that those machines had already 
been configured for rigging the elections? I hope you are aware 
that the machines did not functioning properly? The thing failed 
to work when President Jonathan wanted to vote. Forget all these 
pranks they are playing. In fact, there is no need for even asking 
us to come out and vote. They had already finished rigging and 
compiling the votes even before the elections.4 
The voters in Ogwashi-Ukwu meanwhile were not particularly afraid of 
the truncation of their population; however, they did insist that biometric 
technology is a modern strategy and sophisticated modality for commit-
ting electoral fraud by political gladiators.5 One middle-aged farmer 
claimed that his friend working in the INEC told him in confidence that 
biometric technology could be manipulated, and thus was not a guaran-
teed safeguard against electoral malpractice. He added that he himself 
believed that powerful politicians formatted the technology so that im-
mediately after voting they could automatically reset the machines and 
input new figures favourable for the ruling party.6 Therefore, without an 
understanding of how the technology actually works,7 there is little or no 
basis for increased trust among political parties or for greater legitimacy 
among the electorate (Evrensel 2010) – especially the rural voters in 
Nigeria’s remotest villages here.  
A number of respondents in Zaki-Biam8 stated that even though 
technological advancement was in principle good, Nigeria was not yet 
ripe for it; the country’s politicians nevertheless still imported this tech-
3 Personal interview with a group of 11 rural voters in Afikpo community on 25 
October 2015. 
4 Personal interview with a 45-year-old petty trader in Afikpo community on 25 
October 2015. 
5 Personal interview with a group of nine rural voters in Ogwashi-Ukwu com-
munity, led by a 58-year-old farmer on 16 October 2015. 
6 Personal interview with a 41-year-old farmer in Ogwasi-Ukwu on 8 February 
2016. 
7 Personal interviews as well as accounts of group discussions with respondents 
across Afikpo, Ogwashi-Ukwu, and Zaki-Biam on 10 October 2015. 
8 Personal interviews in Zaki-Biam, in the company of six rural voters, with a key 
informant, a 38-year-old politician, on 24 April 2016. 
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nology. This was for two reasons: to make money from the awarding of 
contracts and to coattail on the inadequacies and operate under the dis-
guise of the problems associated with biometric technology, so as to 
successfully rig elections. Such technology was therefore seen as a des-
perate move by the ruling class to retain power by all means – “a do or 
die affair.” These voters recounted their experiences with biometric 
technology, and how it malfunctioned more than once during the elec-
tions. These accounts align with Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis’s (2018) 
view that ICTs do not make it possible to simply rapidly “leapfrog” to 
cleaner and more credible elections. 
In many instances, these individuals vowed to sabotage this evil 
scheme. Many rural voters9 devised a ploy: namely to press their thumbs 
against the SCRs as many times as possible, so as to ensure the “magic” 
machines captured their fingerprints multiple times. This was perceived 
as a strong tactic and sensible stratagem to counter the tricks of political 
gladiators, and also to ensure higher population numbers for their com-
munities. This bad voting habit largely accounted for the reason why 
about 94 per cent of SCRs could not consistently verify fingerprints (see 
the European Union Election Observation Mission 2015). Attempts at 
electoral fraud in local communities contributed heavily, despite the use 
of biometric technology, to random machine breakdowns. In contrast to 
the scenario in Ghana’s 2012 elections where non-random machine 
breakdowns were attributed to the lack of an election observer present 
(Golden, Kramon, and Ofosu 2014), in Nigeria’s 2015 ones random 
machine breakdowns occurred even despite some election observers 
being on-site. It was this key challenge that mainly led to manual voter 
identification and accreditation. In more than 13 per cent of polling 
units, SCRs were not always able to read PVCs.  
Particularly illustrative was the feeling of some voters10 that their 
biometric data – namely photos and fingerprints – being captured and 
collected by SCRs would expose them to demonic manipulation, and 
could be used for occult practices by their enemies. This fear depicts 
rural voters’ symbolic attachments and perceptions being in line with 
certain core beliefs constituting their traditional worldview – that an 
enemy could use one’s picture to invoke spirits from the spirit world for 
9 Many respondents across Afikpo, Ogwashi-Ukwu, and Zaki-Biam (68 per cent) 
confessed in personal interviews that they had tried voting multiple times dur-
ing the elections (16 October 2015, 25 October 2015, 24 April 2016). 
10 Personal interviews with a 68-year-old elder, a 42-year-old man, a 48-year-old 
female, a 37-year-old female, and with a middle-aged teacher from Afikpo 
community on 14 February 2016. 
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harm or for other fetish rituals. This practice still remains prevalent and 
littered among the daily observances of those local villagers who believe 
in fetish worship. It is therefore very difficult to eradicate such supersti-
tions from the psyche of this group of voters, and to make a clean im-
pression on them generally that biometric technology is truly genuine 
and not intended to inflict spiritual harm. This is linked to voter behav-
iour among those people who shrunk from active engagement in the 
electoral process due to such wrongly held perceptions and evident social 
limitations. 
Social Factors Affecting Biometric Technology Adoption
Rural dwellers generally face larger social infrastructural deficits than 
their counterparts in urban cities (Iwuoha 2013). Core issues of concern 
for rural voters include the non-availability of proper infrastructure and a 
prohibitive geographical distance between polling stations and their 
dwellings.11 The lack, for example, of an effective electricity supply im-
pinged on the functioning of the biometric technology and other ICT 
components deployed during the Nigerian 2015 elections. On the part of 
rural voters, this poor electricity supply largely limited their exposure to 
voter education. Informational programmes are mainly transmitted via 
digital media channels such as television, in order to allow the audiovisu-
al displays that make more effective voters’ education and their adaption 
to new voting methods.  
However most of the voters in rural areas narrated their frustrations 
over the non-availability of electrical power, which denied them the 
opportunity to benefit from the chains of voter education and enlight-
enment programmes rolled out via digital media during the electoral 
cycle. Most rural voters12 frowned on the fact that they were totally neg-
lected and virtually isolated from sharing in the pool of electoral infor-
mation disseminated by the INEC through ICT channels during this 
period. They strongly believed that this treatment impeded their level of 
adaptation to the new voting methods. Voters in Afikpo community13 
revealed that there had been virtually no electrical power supply in their 
11 Personal interviews with key informants: (i) a 43-year-old youth leader in Afi-
kpo; (ii) a 51-year-old chief in Ogwashi-Ukwu; and, (iii) a 38-year-old female 
politician in Zaki-Biam on 14 February 2016. 
12 All the respondents (100 per cent) across Afikpo, Ogwashi-Ukwu, and Zaki-
Biam had problems with their electricity supply. 
13 About nine interviewees in Afikpo confirmed that the community currently had 
no electrical power as a result of a damaged transformer (14 February 2016).  
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community for several months now. Hence they were cut off entirely 
from connecting to the external environment during the election period, 
and so were less informed about the modalities and guidelines for proper 
electoral conduct and behaviour. In Ogwashi-Ukwu, voters14 complained 
that often times they experience low electric-power voltages (i.e. low 
shading), while in Zaki-Biam the supply remained only erratic and highly 
unstable without any form of remediation offered.15 These arrays of 
challenges limited the exposure and opportunities of rural voters to shar-
ing in and benefiting from the pool of available electoral information. An 
informant in Zaki-Biam reported that: 
This is a small town and nothing seems to be working fine here 
like in the city, where things are somehow better. The electricity 
people have forgotten us totally. Could you imagine that we hardly 
see NEPA [electrical power supply] in this community? Even so, 
whenever they manage to bring the light after many days, it 
doesn’t last. This is a big problem to all of us in this community, I 
must tell you. Do you know that I did not know what was hap-
pening concerning the election until it was over? There was no 
electricity power supply to even watch television or listen to news 
and know what INEC was doing. My brother, it is terrible.16 
That is why most of the interviewees had no prior knowledge that bio-
metric verification machines would be deployed on election day, even 
though they had been encouraged – indeed almost forced, or at least 
heavily financially incentivised by urban-based politicians – to participate 
in biometric voter registration.17 
Lack of access to Internet services and connectivity in Nigeria’s rural 
communities remains a debilitating issue. Kuboye, Alese, and Imasuen 
14 Personal interview with a group of nine rural voters in Ogwashi-Ukwu com-
munity, led by a 58-year-old farmer on 16 October 2015. 
15 Personal interviews with two civil servants in Zaki-Biam who work in 
UkumLGA; conducted in the company of three youths who do menial jobs in 
the community (20 October 2017). 
16 Personal interview with a 41-year-old trader in the local market on 12 August 
2016. 
17 Usually these politicians are largely disconnected from their own constituencies, 
but are also directly connected to them by, for example, sharing large “Ghana 
Must Go” bags of money with the chiefs and community leaders who control 
the voting attitudes of their own subjects, kinsmen, and blood relatives. It ap-
pears that in rural communities voting is more a thing of “cash and carry,” 
“one cap fits all,” or of a “bandwagon effect” than in urban environments – 
whose voters have more educational opportunities, and therefore decisional 
and assertive independence over their electoral choices. 
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(2012) establish that Internet service providers do not consider such 
areas economically viable and therefore no attention is given to them. 
This contrasts with the level of access to Internet connectivity in urban 
centres. Nigeria’s number of active Internet connections, especially 
found in urban areas, stands at over 90 million, representing 47.44 per 
cent penetration. As such over 200 communities, between them home to 
about 40 million Nigerians, have been discovered to still lack access to 
basic Internet and ICT facilities in the country (Danbatta 2017). Political 
campaigners generally cash in on this information gap to perpetuate all 
sorts of threats and “fake news” among rural voters. The spread of disin-
formation, targeted at undermining opposition parties, has in some cases 
been accompanied with news of impending dangers – instilling fear and 
terror among vulnerable voters. In this context, social media platforms 
(especially Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter) served as offshoots of this 
cycle of electoral disinformation. As most rural voters did not have ac-
cess to necessary Internet facilities, their opportunities to receive reliable 
and accurate news from relevant stakeholders responsible for educating 
voters on the electoral process was severely constrained.  
Implications of Long Distances between Polling Stations 
and Dwellings for Rural Voters’ Electoral Participation
Significant distances between polling stations and voters’ dwellings pose 
serious challenges in rural communities. This is as a result of the stag-
gered nature of the polling centres’ indiscriminate distribution across the 
communities. Particularly, the introduction of biometric technology by 
the INEC compounded the problems of the geographic inaccessibility of 
polling stations for voters in rural communities.  
First, to contend with the limited capabilities of the SCRs in terms 
of managing large volumes of voter data, the INEC reconfigured the 
structure of polling stations by introducing the concept of “Voting 
Points” (VPs). Herein polling stations with large numbers of voters are 
split into two or more VPs such that each has an average of 500 regis-
tered voters (Jega 2014). This did not, however, do away with the prob-
lem of overcrowded polling stations – arising from the exponential 
growth in Nigeria’s population that has come with accompanying severe 
demographic shifts, and that has resulted in new settlements emerging in 
rural communities without any polling units in them or even within rea-
sonable distance. For example, the present structure of polling stations in 
Nigeria – which has 120,000 of them across 8,809 wards (RAs) was cre-
ated in 1996, when the population size was an estimated 110 million 
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people. This structure remained in place for the 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 
and 201518 general elections, that despite the country’s present popula-
tion size being estimated at 175 million people – representing a nearly 60 
per cent rise on the 1996 figure. 
Second, to guarantee the optimum functionality of the biometric 
technology, the INEC relocated the polling units from “infront of” pri-
vate houses and other such “unsuitable places,” to inside classrooms, 
public buildings, or to public open spaces – as well as other such fitting 
enclosures where tents could be provided (Jega 2014). This restructuring 
further deepened the issues of the distance and accessibility of polling 
units for rural voters. Therefore ICTs negatively changed the situational 
and environmental context of balloting, with the dire consequence of a 
lack of ease of access to the polling station for many rural communities 
in Nigeria.  
Most rural voters complained19 of long distances between their 
abodes and the polling units, which demoralised them and deterred them 
from participating fully in all facets and segments of the elections. Some 
voters expressed the utmost disappointment that their poor electoral 
participation should be blamed on the INEC leadership for not carrying 
out a proper delineation.20 An informant21 in Afikpo community narrat-
ed how the issue of significant distance between polling units and voters’ 
dwellings was complicated by a lack of access roads and poor transporta-
tion networks. Election day in Nigeria always comes with a restriction of 
movement. Hence, no taxis or Okada (motorbikes) were found to 
transport certain elderly men and women to their respective polling units 
in the most remote rural locations. This debarred many rural voters, 
especially the women and elderly ones who could not trek long distances, 
from taking part in the electoral exercise. 
The narrative presented by some voters in Ogwashi-Ukwu commu-
nity was particularly touching.22 They disclosed that a particular political 
party (name withheld) distributed monetary amounts ranging from NGN 
18 In 2015, the INEC introduced the VPs. 
19 Many respondents across Afikpo, Ogwashi-Ukwu, and Zaki-Biam (88 per cent) 
complained in personal interviews that they experienced difficulties trekking to 
their polling units (25 October 2015, 9 February 2016, 24 April 2016). 
20 Personal interviews with a 68-year-old elder, a 42-year-old man, a 48-year-old 
female, a 37-year-old female, and a middle-aged taxi driver from Afikpo com-
munity on 14 February 2016.  
21 Personal interview with a 43-year-old youth leader in Afikpo community on 18 
July 2017. 
22 Personal interview with a group of nine rural voters in Ogwashi-Ukwu com-
munity, led by a 58-year-old farmer on 16 October 2015. 
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3,000 to 5,000 on the voting premises, despite the presence of one or 
two security officials. It was therefore the news of this development that 
motivated some voters to rush by all available means to their polling 
centres to benefit from this “unethical largesse.” However, it was further 
revealed that during the 2015 elections a good number of those who 
were unable to take on the difficulty and stress of trekking to their far-
away polling centres, amid inaccessible roads and flooding, auctioned 
their voters’ cards to some party agents for a flat rate of NGN 5,000 
each. These party agents capitalised on the INEC’s resorting to manual 
accreditation/voting, following the widespread malfunctioning of the 
biometric SCRs, by assembling mercenaries from neighbouring villages 
to cast these votes by proxy using “strange” voters’ cards. These shady 
dealings clearly underpinned the practice of vote buying – an unethical 
voting behaviour that has become prevalent in local communities as a 
result of the poor social conditions of dwellers there.  
Therefore, the use of ICTs in the conducting of elections in rural 
communities actually contributed to the disenfranchisement of rural 
voters and weakened the integrity of the electoral process. Over 2.3 
million of those accredited (7.3 per cent) did not ultimately even cast 
their ballot (see the European Union Election Observation Mission 
2015). Voter turnout declined to a mere 47 per cent in the 2015 general 
elections, the time when this technology was first introduced. The fac-
tors described here suggest that rural voters disproportionately make up 
these statistics. 
Conclusion
This analysis relates biometric technology innovation to public percep-
tions and powerful social factors, in the context of changing interactions. 
The majority of voters in elections are found in local communities (Fuji-
wara 2015), and their predominant electoral beliefs lead to low or high 
voter turnout generally. If they are characteristically bonded by strong 
socio-political facts or myths, for instance, it tends to define or recreate 
their specific and peculiar voting behaviours/beliefs at all times. These 
beliefs are usually oriented or patterned along negative and hostile lines. 
Rural voters seem not to be attuned to the new-found biometric tech-
nology in Africa, owing to their own specific traditional perceptions and 
social challenges.  
Thus, in line with McGrath and Maiye’s (2010a) analytical position, 
biometric technology impinged on the constitutive freedom of rural 
voters. The interface between rural voters and biometric technology 
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presented shades of incompatible values. Rural voters’ behaviours and 
inclinations for distrust towards biometric technology spurred infractions 
and disorderliness that undermined the entire electoral process, as it lost 
most of its essence and credibility. The effect hereof is that rural voters 
are largely unable to adapt, modify, or align their voting behavioural 
patterns with the modern innovations and methods employed in the 
electoral process. 
This study has revealed that rural voters in Nigeria’s remotest com-
munities generally face social deficits such as the non-availability of 
proper infrastructure and long distances between polling stations and 
their dwellings. Generally, the lack of effective electrical power supply 
and Internet services impinged on the functioning of the biometric tech-
nology and other ICT components deployed during the elections; on the 
part of rural voters, meanwhile, it largely limited their exposure to the 
digital media channels such as television through which voter education 
is promoted. Thus there was a tangible lack of vital voting information, 
poor voter education, and little adaption to new voting methods among 
the rural population.  
The consequences of these realities are manifold. They lead to rural 
voters’ loss of trust in the INEC, low voter turnout in elections, appal-
ling political behaviours, and declining political participation generally. 
The best strategy to tackle this problem is building strong measures so as 
to counter and confront the discussed myths, perceptions, and general 
belief systems of rural voters, which limit their ability to build lasting 
confidence in and adapt effectively to biometric technology.  
Some possible further measures include factoring social infrastruc-
tural development programmes for rural communities into the budget 
estimates of the INEC in the year prior to the conducting of elections. 
The INEC should also initiate and build collaborative partnerships with 
local activists, and ensure that the local security set-up is incorporated 
into the strategy for policing local areas during elections. In addition, 
there should be concrete strategies for monitoring social media infor-
mation/postings during elections to ensure that only genuine and not 
fake news is disseminated to the public during electioneering campaigns 
and the voting process. More importantly the INEC could improve the 
credibility of elections in rural communities by conducting extensive 
voter education programmes, to build trust and confidence among the 
rural population on the usefulness of ICT infrastructures for the con-
ducting of elections in Nigeria. 
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IKT und Wahlen in Nigeria: Einführung von biometrischer  
Wahltechnologie in ländlichen Gebieten 
 
Zusammenfassung: Die Anwendungen von Innovationen im Bereich 
der Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologie (IKT) sind im 
Wahlzyklus von großer Bedeutung. Biometrische Technologie erobert 
derzeit die Entwicklungsländer. Sie wird aber von den Wählern auf dem 
Land nur schlecht angenommen. Ändert die Nutzung von biometrischer 
Technologie das Wahlverhalten der Bevölkerung auf dem Land vor dem 
Hintergrund sozialer Herausforderungen? Der Zusammenhang zwischen 
diesen Realitäten und ihren Folgen wird in der Literatur noch nicht um-
fassend behandelt. Der Artikel argumentiert, dass die öffentliche Wahr-
nehmung der biometrischen Technologie, die Verfügbarkeit einer geeig-
neten Infrastruktur und die Entfernung zwischen den Wahllokalen und 
den Siedlungen der Wähler auf dem Land allesamt beeinflussen, inwie-
weit die ländliche Bevölkerung solche Technologien annimmt. Dieses 
Zusammenspiel führt zu spezifischen Modalitäten, die das Wahlverhalten 
und die allgemeine politische Kultur prägen. Ich nutze Primärdaten aus 
abgelegenen Dörfern in Nigeria, um zu zeigen, wie politische Entschei-
dungsträger Herausforderungen bei der Anwendung biometrischer 
Technologien schönreden und welche Folgen dies hat. Abschließend 
betrachte ich, wie diese Wechselwirkungen und Interaktionen zu „räum-
lichen Unterschieden“ bei Wahlergebnissen/Glaubwürdigkeit führen 
und biete mögliche Strategien für institutionelle Interventionen an. 
 
Schlagwörter: Nigeria, Independent National Electoral Commission, 
biometrische Technologie, Akzeptanz biometrischer Technologie, Wäh-
ler in ländlichen Gebieten 
